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OF LINES AND MEN: THE SUPREME COURT,
OBSCENITY, AND THE ISSUE OF
TIE AVERTABLE EYE
Norman W. Provizer*t
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of recent Supreme Court decisions dealing with
the issue of obscenity, this article will engage in an analytical discussion of the considerations which affect the Court's decision-making
process. Initially, propositions dealing with the functions of the
Supreme Court as an institution will be considered. A preface relating
those propositions to the line-drawing role of the Court in decisions
dealing with constitutional law and politics follows. Next, the issue of
the avertable eye in obscenity decisions of the Supreme Court is discussed by relating it to various themes, such as the input-output dimension of court rulings, the approach and application of judicial authority,
the dynamic aspects of judicial decisions, and the judicial reasoning
process.

II.

T

PRoPosiTIoNs

We are rapidly approaching the 175th anniversary of John
Marshall's "critical" decision in Marbury v. Madison.' In the decades
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Louisiana State University, Shreveport;
A.B. Lafeyette College; M.A., Ph.D. University of Pennsylvania.
-t I would like to express my appreciation to the National Endowment for the
Humanities, for its financial support of this project and Dr. Henry J. Abraham, Henry
L. and Grace Doherty Memorial Foundation Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, for his intellectual stimulation. Needless to say, the
views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

See B.

ScHwamz, CoNSrrrT

ONAL LAW

3

(1972): "That Marshall's opinion was not radical innovation does not detract from its
position as the cornerstone of the constitutional edifice." The use of the word "critical"
here is in line with V.0. Key's discussion of "critical elections" as "a type of election
in which there occurs a sharp and durable electoral realignment between parties". See
Key, A Theory of Critical Elections, 17 J. OF POL. 4 (1955); see also W.D. BURNHAM,
CRcAL EL EcIoNs AND THE MAisRiNGS OF AmERIcAN PoLmTcs passim (1970).
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that have passed since Marshall's opinion staked out the position and

power of America's "least dangerous" branch of government,2 the
Supreme Court has played a crucial, if somewhat enigmatic role in the
forging and continuance of the constitutional system of the United

States. The passing decades, however, have not abated discussions of
exactly what "is" and what "ought" to be the function of the Court in

the American political system.'
While it is clearly beyond the scope of this paper to review and
evaluate the myriad contours which are produced by the collision of
differing perspectives on the Court, it is useful to articulate several

basic propositions which are accepted arguendo throughout this analysis. 4
The first of these propositions is that the Court is a multi-

functional structure, integrating legal, political, governmental and
moral dimensions within a single institution. In this sense, the Court
not only adjudicates according to legal principles and traditions, but it
is also inextricably interwoven into the public policy making process. 5
To use the words of Jack Peltason: "A judge is in the political process

and his activity is interest activity not as a matter of choice but of function."6
For a brief overview of judicial review and Marbury v. Madison, see L. JAYsoN,
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 669-85
(1973).
2. "Mhe judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least
dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution. . . . The judiciary . . has no
influence over either the sword of the purse." Tim FEDERALIST No. 78, at 521 (A.
Hamilton) (J.E. Cooke ed. 1961). Cf. N. Glazer, Towards an ImperialJudiciary?,PUnLiC INTEREST 104 (1975). Also see A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANc-: THE
SUPREiE COURT AT THE BAR OF PoLmrcs (1962) [hereinafter cited as A. BICKEL,
LEAST DANGEROUS] and Justice Brandeis' comments in Homing v. District of Columbia,
254 U.S. 135, 139 (1920) that a judge "may advise; he may persuade; but he may not
command or coerce."
3. That the passing of time has not ended such intellectual discussions is neither
surprising nor unique. See, e.g., I. Shenkar, Historians Still Debating the Meaning of
the American Revolution-If It Was a Revolution, N.Y. TImEs, Jul. 6, 1976, at 13. On
the Court specifically, see R. BERGER, CONGRESS v. THE SUPREME COURT (1975).
4. For an example of differing perspectives, see the readings in ThE SuPRasm
COURT IN AMRICAN POLrncs: JUDIcIAL AcTvsM vs. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT (D. Forte
ed. 1972).
5. See G. SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL Pocmy-MmNG (rev. ed. 1974).
6. J. PELTASON, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL PRocESS 3 (1955). Yet to say
that a judge is in the political process is not necessarily equal to holding that a judge
is totally of the political process. Compare, G. E. WmTE, Ti AMERIcAN JUDICIAL TRADITION passim (1976), [hereinafter cited as G. E. WHIT, JUDICIAL TaADrIoN], to wit;
'The hard question is one of degree: how large or small a political role should the
Court play?". See also A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMEwICAN GovERNMBNT 99 (1976) [hereinafter cited as A. Cox, SuPREME COURT].
THE CoNsTIION OF THE UNITED STATES:
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Second, the Supreme Court, even as an institution, does not exist
in a vacuum. Both the Court's self-perception of its role and its actions
are intimately connected to social, economic, political, cultural, and

ideological spheres which analytically lie outside "the marble palace."
These various linkages and interactions, while including direct restraints, also produce less direct and less formal constraints on Court
activities.7 A corollary of this proposition is that the Supreme Court
cannot be categorized as exclusively an independent or a dependent

variable in the American constitutional system. Simply stated, the
Court affects the system, while it is itself affected by the system within
which it functions. 8
The third proposition.focuses on our disposition to avail ourselves
of the Court's decision-making voice to provide answers for the con-

sistently difficult questions which plague any political society. As de
Tocqueville observed with his usual prescience: "Scarcely any political
question arises in the United States that is not resolved sooner or later,
into a judicial question."9 Yet this situation often places the Court
squarely on "the horns of a dilemma": the Court's legitimacy motivates
us to look to that institution for the resolution of critical questions, while
the Court's actions in resolving such questions can erode the base of
its legitimacy. 10
7. See W. MURPHrY,ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 19-29 (1964).
8. See the discussion of the reciprocal relationship between the court and the
American populace in White, The Supreme Court's Public and the Public's Supreme
Court, 52 VA. Q. Rnv. 373 (1976) [hereinafter cited as White, The Supreme Court's
Public]. An attitudinal perspective on this issue is provided by W. Muir's study of
28 public school officials before and after the Court's decision in School District v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 208 (1963); see W. Mum, LAw AND ArrrrTUDE CHANGE (1973),
originally published as PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1967). On the educational role
of the Court, see A. Cox, SUPREME COURT, supra, note 6, at 117-18. Also see the various impact studies in Tim IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (T. Becker and M.
Feeley eds., 2d ed. 1973).
9. DE TOCQUEVILLE DEMOCRACY IN AMMUCAN (1835), to wit:
The language of the law thus becomes, in some measure, a common tongue;
the spirit of the law, which is produced in the schools and courts of justice,
gradually penetrates beyond their walls into the bosom of society, where it
descends to the lowest classes, so that at last the whole people contract the
habits and the tastes of the judicial magistrate.
Also involved here is the issue (one which is of increasing importance) that if you cannot win in the legislature, you go to the courts, and by so doing the courts are used
to circumvent the political process. Some of the negative implications of such action
have been noted by James Bradley Thayer (i.e., that it "elipses ... the political capacity
of the people" and deadens "its sense of moral responsibility"), discussed in A. Cox,
SUPREME COURT, supra note 6, at 116-17.
10. See A. Cox, SUPREME COURT, supra note 6, at 103-15, for an overview of the
"power of the legitimacy"; accord, L. LUsKEY, BY WHAT Rsomr? passim (1975). See
also P. KURLAND, PROBLEMS OF THE POLITICAL COURT IN PoLmCs, THE CONSTITUTION,
AND THE WARREN COURT

170-206 (1970) [hereinafter cited as P.
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The fourth proposition holds that although the "Court" is a singular
noun, it is, in fact, a plural institution. The Court is not a monolith,
and while it issues an opinion, it frequently speaks in many tongues."
Thus, the Court's collegiate nature has enormous and varied repercussions both on the functioning of the institution itself and on its relationships with the "world" outside.
Our final proposition is, in many ways, obvious and simple, yet
one which remains most perplexing and complex. The Supreme Court
is not an abstraction void of values and views; it is an institution, but
like all institutions it is made up of human beings who do not exist in
a vacuum. To borrow the eloquent statement of Benjamin Cardozo:
"The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do not turn
aside in their course and pass judges by."' 2

III.

THE PREFACE

A primary feature of constitutional adjudication in the United
States is the persistence of uncertainty, and it is valuable to recall
Holmes' statement that: "[W]here there is doubt the simple tool of
logic does not suffice, and even if it is disguised and unconscious, the
judges are called on to exercise the sovereign prerogative of choice.""
Choices need be made, lines must be drawn, and, in this sense,
"[j]udgment consists in drawing lines."'1 4 Needless to say, such lines
COURT]. See also F. GRAHm~, MIRANDA: SELF-INFLICTED WOUND, IN THE DUE PROCESS
REVOLU ION: Tim WARREN CouRT's IMPACT ON CRuMINAL LAW 153-93 (1970).

11. H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 199-217 (3d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited
as H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS], offering a concise review of "assigning and
writing opinions," including the importance of Marshall's departure from seriatim opin-

ion writing.
12. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as B. CARDozo, THE NATURE]. See also I. FRANK, Are Judges Human?, in COURTS ON
TRIAL 146-56 (1973); accord, J. M. ROSENBERG, JERoME FRANK: JURIST AND PHLOSOPHER 1-47 (1970).
13. See O.W. HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED LEPGAL
PAPERS 210 (1920). See also E. RosTow, THFn SOVEREIGN PREROGATivE: THE SUPREME

COURT AND THE QUEST FOR LAw at ii (1962); Cf. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244
U.S. 205, 221 (1917), (Justice Holmes states: "I recognize without hesitation that
judges must and do legislate, but they do not do so only interstitially; they are confined
from molar to molecular motions."); B. CAozo, Tm NATURE, supra note 12, at 6971, wherein the theory of "gaps in the law" is discussed. Accord, G. E. WMTE, JuDICIL TRADITION, supra note 6, at 2, dealing with the 19th century view of the judge

as law-maker.
14. Henkin, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HAIv. L. REv. 63 (1968). It
should also be noted at this point, that while the major thrust of our discussion is concerned with constitutional adjudication, the Court's decisions are not limited to that realm
and include other, such as statutory, facets of adjudicatioqn.............
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are drawn by human hands functioning within a dynamic context, within
a system in which even verities are ofttimes fleeting. Yet, the recognition of the act of line-drawing, as well as the acknowledgment of the
difficulties inherent in perceiving "just how and where to draw a
line,"'15 is not equivalent to conceptualizing and analyzing the process
itself. Thus, before examining the Supreme Court and the issue of the
avertable eye, we offer a brief preface to the line-drawing idea in the
field of constitutional law and politics.
In this preface, line-drawing is explored in terms of four underlying themes. Together, these themes (viz., input-output; differing approaches and applications; dynamism; and rational-arational) comprise
a set. Therefore, while the themes are analytically distinguishable,
they are also interrelated and, at points, a degree of overlap occurs.
The first of these themes, that of input-output, concerns itself with
the fact that even though line-drawing is most widely discussed as an
output (i.e., a final decision), there exists an additional and crucial input dimension which involves the making of what we might term preliminary decisions.'" In a quasi-communications sense, this means that
line-drawing is utilized not only in the sending out of messages, but
also in the reception of signals.
This input dimension can be readily observed if we look at the
process of case selection.' 7 For there is, after all, the line-drawing
question of which cases will or will not be taken, and the relationship
of such line-drawing to the procedural and substantive orientations of
the members of the Court. Frequently, this aspect of line-drawing is
linked to what is commonly referred to as perceptions of judicial
activism or restraint.
15. A. Cox, SUPREmE COURT, supra note 6, at 42. Here Cox is speaking of this
issue relative to crime. Cf., Goldstein, The Courts Are Blurry on Defining Entrapment,
N.Y. TrMEs, July 18, 1876, at E7. Writing on entrapment, Goldstein states, "but the
line exists in principle" (between legal and illegal police activity). This usage of the
word, line, implies an established standard, whereas our main concentration is on
line-drawing as a continual, creative process. See B. CARDozo, THE NATuRE, supra note
12, at 166; "I have grown to see that the judicial process in its highest reaches is not
discovery, but creation." Yet it is important to note that the word is utilized on both
senses and, furthermore, that both usages are related.
16. BLAcK's LAw DICTIoNARY 494 (4th ed. 1968), defines decision as: "A term
having no fixed, legal meaning." Accord, J. LAPALoMmARA, PoLTiCS WrrnIN NATIONS
26 (1974), indicating decision making as "those processes. . . that involve choice."
17. See D. RHODE & H. SPAEvH, SuPREmE COuRT DEcIsIoN MAXINO 118-33 (1976);

H. ABRAHAM, Thm JurDrcu PRocEss, supra note 11, at 174-85. Also compare, J. EIsENsTmu, POLITIcS AND TE LEGAL PRocEss, 179 (1973), stating that through the Court's
power to pick and choose appellate cases: "It can avoid deciding politically sensitive
cases. . or it ran postpone them uim . more auspicio tine,"
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Who has standing?

When does a case or controversy exist?

What defines a political question? Which cases are ripe and of sufficient importance?

These are all issues that are repeatedly associated

and whether a Justice's main commitment lies
with judicial orientation
8

in means or ends.1
That such preliminary decisions are not always easily made can
be seen in Justice Frankfurter's expressed "disquietude that the line
is often very thin between the cases in which the Court felt compelled
to abstain from adjudication because of their 'political' nature, and the
cases that so frequently arise in applying the concepts of 'liberty' and
'equality.' "19 Frankfurter's statement also brings us to another factor

which should be explicitly noted. At the input line-drawing aspects of
case selection, two levels are involved: First, there are the individual

judgments of the Justices and second, there is the collective judgment
(or line-drawing) made by the Court which consists of the individual
judgments, but at the same time transcends them. If, for example,

four justices vote to accept a writ of certiorariin a case in a particular
area (based on the lines drawn relative to their individual commit-

ments), then a collective input line is drawn, although it might not be
congruent with all of the individual decisions.20
This two-level situation is also evident when we move to our
second theme, that of differing approaches and applications.

While

this theme focuses directly on the output dimension of judicial decisionmaking, consideration must be given both to the output decisions of
individual Justices and the output decisions of the Court as a collective

body. Questions of judicial philosophy enter, and often output decisions
are discussed in terms of Justice and Court activism or passivity. 2
18. See, e.g., Henkin, The Supreme Court 1967 Term, supra note 14, at 72-76, dealing with, "The Standing of Standing: Laying Down a New Line". See also G. E.
WrITE, THE JUDICIAL TRADITION, supra note 6, at 317-68, concerning "the mosaic of
Warren Court," offering some perspectives of commitments.
19. H. WECHSLER, TOWARD PRINCIPLES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, IN PRINCIPLES,
POLITcS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAw 11 (1961). Wechsler argues here that the line is
thinner than it need.or ought to be relative to his "neutral principles." Whether or not
the line, in the sense used in the article, is too thin does not eliminate the fact that
some sort of line exists. See note 15 supra.
20. That a collective input line is drawn in appellate cases does not rule out the
existence of significance of dissent. See, e.g., A. WEsrIN, THE ANATOMY OF A CONSrISee, A. BART , PROPnETS wrrH HONOR (1975); see
TUxnONAL LAW CAsE 93 (1958).

also, R.

RUGWELL, MODEL FOR A NEw CONSTIrnTON

21 (1970), stating that: "When

it became common knowledge that many final decisions were made by a five to four majority ... the fallacy of judicial infallibility was exposed."
21. It must be remembered that judicial activism or restraint need be measured in
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Thus a consideration of the degree and kind of commitments held by
the Justices and the Court toward proceduralism and substantivism is
almost inexorably interwoven into discussions of output line-drawing.22
Rather than directly entering the conundrum of Court activism per
se, this perspective on output line-drawing concentrates on less emotional continua and their corollaries. The first of these deals with the
differing approaches brought by Justices (and, in turn, the Court) to
the making of output decisions. In a very real sense, this "approach"
perspective involves the drawing of base lines and revolves around the
commitment to absolutist-relativist principles. It is important to note
that included in this perspective are the following propositions: (1)
the boundary maintenance between absolutist and relativist principles
is weak; (2) absolutist and relativist principles, in their pure form, are
ideal types and what is of key significance is the definable mixture of
those principles existent within a given context and time period; (3)
commitments to these principles are mutable; and (4) that a commitment to the absolutist area of the continuum is23 not a negation of linedrawing, but rather a particular expression of it.
The second continuum concerns the actual lines drawn in the
Court's opinions. Looking at a Court decision, we can distinguish (at
least in terms of degree) hard or positive line-drawing from soft or
a given context. G. SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL PoLicy 213 (1974), argues that: "From a
functionalist point of view, therefore, the Court is activist when its decisions conflict
with those of other political policy makers, and the Court exercises restraint when it
accepts the policies of other decision makers." However, this view runs into some difficulties when we consider a Court that actively pursues its "legitimating" function, rather
than its "checking" function. On the importance of the "legitimating" function, see C.
BLACK, Tim PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960). See also the comments on the "letigimnating" function in A. BIcKEL, THE LEAST DANGERoUs, supra note 2, at 29-33; P. URLAND, PoLTics, THE CoNsrrrtmoN, supra note 10, at 34-39. Accord, Mason, The
Burger Court and HistoricalPerspective, 89 POL. ScI. Q. 32 (1974), stating that: "The
fact is that all Courts have been activist in one way or another."
22. Here the term "degree" implies a quantitative dimension, while "kind" implies
a qualitative dimension. We emphasize "kind" because of its importance in seeing the
difference between commitments to substantivism/proceduralism and commitments to
a particular form of substantivism/proceduralism. See, e.g., G. E. White, Judicial Tradition, supra note 6, at 317-368.
23. Id. at 331-55, wherein Justice Black's philosophy is shown to recognize Marshall's phrase, "[Mhat it is a constitution we are expounding . . . ." and that: "This
view which I have of the Constitution does not render government powerless to meet
new times, new circumstances and new conditions." See H. BLACK, A. CONSTrrutbONA.
FArH 8 (1969) [hereinafter cited as H. BLACK, CONSTITUTIONAL F rm]. Black's literal
approach to the Constitution is complimented by his expansive interpretation of the document's language, and lines are drawn even if "balancing" is rejected. Thus, while an
absolutist perspective is in some ways different from a relativist one, it nonetheless remains linked to the line-drawing process within the American constitutional process.
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tentative line-drawing. To use slightly different terms, does the judgment of the Court draw a reasonably clear and definite line in a case
or, is the line drawn unclear and indefinite? Implicit within this consideration are two further, yet parallel questions. The first is whether

the Court's decision has only ontogenetic implications, or whether the
line drawn has implications of a general or phylogenetic nature.2 4 The
second is whether the line drawn exists comfortably within the realm

of adjudication, or whether it significantly trespasses into legislative
25
territory.

There is an additional aspect of this differing "applications" perspective which must also be recognized.

In some cases, it can be

argued that there is not a line to be drawn,2 6 but even more importantly
that the Court's judgment seeks to avoid drawing a line. While line
avoidance logically involves line-drawing within our view, it is nonethe-

less worthwhile to take somewhat special cognizance of decisions which
attempt specifically to avoid lines by judging not on the merits of cases,

but rather on secondary issues or circumstances.
All of these factors combine to make the theme of differing
approaches and applications one of enormous complexity. Yet there

remains a final dimension which compounds the difficulties inherent
in this theme.

This dimension is related to the fact that line-drawing

is more than a singular, discrete action. Line-drawing decisions in particular cases are also part of an ongoing process. To put it simply, linedrawing is not a one-shot operation. Given this situation, we have to
consider the serial attributes of drawing output lines and examine
24. The distinction between those decisions which are of importance for the development of a single case and those whose importance is for the development of a class
of cases is highlighted here. Clearly, however, these are interrelated and the boundary
between them is not always easily discernable. See H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND TmE
COURT 189-205 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM], wherein
he attempts to establish "judicial line formulae" (such as the "clear and present danger"
test and the "bad tendency" test in the area of expression).
25. H. ABRAHAm, THE JUDIcIL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 319-28, discussing
"drawing the line or attempting to do so" between judicial legislating and judging. See
also A. BIcKEL, THE LEAsr DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 2, at 35-36, analyzing
Thayer's rule of "the clear mistake."
26. Henkin, The Supreme Court 1967, supra note 14, at 63.
27. See H. ABRAHAM, THE JuDiciAL. PROCESS, Supra note 11, at 354-76, for a discussion of "The Sixteen Great Maxims of Judicial Self-Restraint," note especially
maxim twelve. Also consult Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936), wherein he outlines the seven rules
that the Court has developed "under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of
all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision." Id. at 346.
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whether later decisions reinforce, reconstruct, or erase the lines drawn
earlier in a particular area.28
This point leads directly into our third theme, that of dynamism.
For time and time again, "[w]e draw our little lines and they are hardly
down before we blur them. ' 29 Thus we cannot escape the fact that
line-drawing is a dynamic process whereby the Court may be concerned
with the complex events existing in a limited time period and ignoring
historical antecedents, or may be dealing only with the change in judicial language as it has occurred over a period of time. 0 The court is
intertwined with a constellation of forces, and its judgments are interconnected with the realignments which take place within that constellation.
The forces themselves are many and they manifest themselves on
a multitude of levels, ranging from intra-psychic, to intra-collegiate, to
inter-governmental and trans-societal. Attempts "to draw the line
once and for all,"'' 3 fail as the Court is touched by the political world

of "[m]irrors and blue smoke." 32 Similarly, shifts in the visions of
societal interests and obligations draw the Court into their vortex and
"may enjoin upon the judge the duty of drawing the line at another
angle, of staking the path along new courses, of marking a new point
of departure from which others who come after him will set upon their
28. See B. CARDozo, THE NATuRE, supra note 12, at 48, where he states: "At last
there emerges a rule or principle which becomes a datum, a point of departure, from
which new courses will be measured. Sometimes the rule or principle is found to have
been formulated too narrowly or too broadly, and has to be refrained."
29. Id. at 161. In this regard, also note E. RosTow, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE,
supra note 13, at 33, that the Justices "grapple with a new problem, deal with it
over and over again, as its dimensions change. . . They settle one case and find themselves tormented by its unanticipated progeny."
30. While we are emphasizing the dynamic nature of linedrawing, we must exercise
extreme caution not to ignore the role of stare decisis in the constitutional process and
the Court's desire for institutional continuity. "But since constitutional law depends
even more on its soundness than its firmness, in a conflict between precedent and progress, precedent will, more quickly than in other fields of law, yield to 'progress'." C.
MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 17 (1973). See also R. BisCHOFF, The Role of Official Precedents, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 77-85
(E. Cahn ed. 1971). Compare Justice Harlan's concurring memorandum opinion in
Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 327 (1969); A. GOLDBERG, ConstitutionalStare Decisis,
in EQUAL JUSTICE; THE WARREN ERA OF THE SUPREME COURT (1972) [hereinafter cited
as A. GOLDBERG, EQUAL JUSTICE].
31. H. ABRA-rM, TnE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 323, where he discusses

Justice Robert's side by side theory in U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). See also Chief
Justice Chases opinion for the Court in Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603
(1870).
32. To borrow the colorful, but descriptive language in I. BRESLIN, How TE GOOD
Guys FINALLY WON 31 (1976).
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Therefore, we must constantly recognize not only the ex-

istence of inextricable connections between the legal and other systems
of society, but also consistently attempt to specify the form, direction,
and meaning of such connections.3 4
Yet, while we have emphasized the flexible and dynamic aspects
of line-drawing, and while some lines emerge based only marginally

on rhyme or reason, the line-drawing process does not exist in a world
separated from judicial/legal principles. Immersed in the political
process, the Court nonetheless remains distinguishable (if not distinct)
from other governmental institutions.3" If one accepts, to some degree, that "the source of judicial authority [is] the process of judicial
reasoning," 36 then a principled approach to decisions, no matter how
difficult to define and achieve, cannot be ignored.17

In other words,

"[t]hat a line has to be drawn somewhere does not mean that it may
be drawn anywhere."3 "
Herein we discover the core of our last theme, the rational-

arational continuum.

This theme, in a very real sense, refers to the

judgments made of the Court's judgment, and whether the Court's line-

drawing decision is perceived to be "a symbol of rationality"3 9 or based
on a foundation of jurisprudential sand. Does the Court's opinion es-

tablish its grounding in "legal," rather than other considerations?4"
Should the Court decide less and explain more?41 Both questions are
closely related to the line-drawing process, as well as the issues of judi33. B. CARDOZO, ThE NATURE, supra note 12, at 113.
34. See J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUsTICE (1976), which paraphases Thomas Reed
Powell's definition of the legal mind "as one that could think of something that was
inextricably connected to something else without thinking about what it was connected
to."

35. See G. E. WmTE, Tim AmmCAN JUDICIAL, supra note 6, at 371-72.

Cf. M.

SHAPIRO, FREEIDOOM OF SPEECH: THE SuPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL IEVIEw (1966).

36. G. E. WmTE, THE Al&mRIcAN JUDICIAL, supra note 6, at 34.
37. Id. at 33-34; H. WECIsLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, supra note 19, at 3-48; Miller
& Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 27 U. Cm. L. REv.
661 (1960); A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROus BRANCH, supra note 2, at 49-65, wherein
he comments that: "No good society can be unprincipled; and no viable society can be
principle-ridden." See also J. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy and the Supreme Court,
20 STAN. L. RaV. 169 (1968).
38. Henkin, The Supreme Court 1967 Term, supranote 14, at 63.
39. Id. at 64.
40. G. E. WHE, THE AmmcAN JUDICIAL, supra note 6, at 370.
41. See L. LnvY, Tn SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WAREN 228-38 (1972). On
this question related to the Warren Court, see A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970); A. Cox, TIHE WARREN COURT (1968); P. KURLAND, POLITICS,
THE CONSrTntYrION, supra note 10, at 170-206; A. GOLDBERG, EQUAL JusrcE, supra
note 31, at 67-97.
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In short, the

Court is like the sower who "may mistake and sow his peas crookedly;

the peas make no mistake but come up and show his line."48
IV.

THE HIGHWAYS AND BYWAYS TO JACKSONVILLE AND BEYOND
From our preface to line-drawing, it is not difficult to see that the

where, how, why and when dimensions of drawing the line involve
some of the most crucial aspects of law and adjudication. 44 Line-drawing is a complex, perennial, and ofttimes difficult process, and must be
recognized as such. Yet this recognition does not preclude us from
examining and evaluating attempts at drawing a line. Thus we now
move from the more general to the more particular, and analyze the
lines surrounding the issue of the avertable eye.

In his classic dissent in Olmstead v. U.S.,4" Justice Brandeis wrote
of the idea of privacy---"the right to be let alone"--as "the most com-

40
prehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.1
Here, Brandeis "pleaded for an application of the Fourth and Fifth

Amendments not in their narrow, literal terms, but in their larger de-

sign as safeguarding a right of privacy essential to the idea of human
dignity and personal integrity.

'4 7

Whether or not privacy is "the right

most valued by civilized men" is a question which lies beyond the purview of this study. Yet, while we hesitate to undertake a comprehen42. See WHITE, THE SUPREME COURT'S PUBLIC supra note 8, at 375, stating that:
"If the Court is not somehow distinguishable from its current occupants-if the institution itself has no identity over time-then law becomes equated with idiosyncratic judgments by people on whose actions there is no effective political check." Also note
Brandeis' statement, in Homing v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 139 (1920), that
the judge "does coerce when, without convincing the judgment, he overcomes the will
by the weight of his authority." Compare Brandeis' view with R. McCLos.Ey, THE
MODERN SUPREME COURT 279 (1972), that:
Legislators are not always strangers to the reasoning process: judges cannot
always eliminate all quality of fiat from their decisions. Perhaps the most we
can say is that judges should be thought of as striving more determinedly to
reduce the element of fiat; that they must be more reluctant to reach the point
where will alone rules.
43. A. RANNEY, CURING THE MISCHIEFS OF FACTION 210 (1975) (citing the aphorism
of Ralph Waldo Emerson). It should be noted here that while we speak of drawing
a line, we often are referring to a plural process where several lines are developed or
where a single line consists of, in fact, a series of shorter lines.
44. T. ROSENBERG, JEROME FRANK, JURIST. AND PHLOSOPHEr 135 (1970), and A.
BIKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS, supra note 2, at 60.
45. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
46. Id. See also the phrase, "the right to be let alone" as discussed by Judge
Thomas Cooley in A. BRECKENRMGE, THm RIGHT TO PRIVACY 1 (1971).
47. A. BARTH, PROPHETS WrrH HONOR 65 (1974).
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sive explication of both the normative and empirical sides of this question, we are, nonetheless, drawn to a consideration of the broad implications of "the right to be let alone."
This consideration rests neither on the sanctity of the home, nor
on the conjugal bed, nor strictly speaking on the procedural guarantess
of the Bill of Rights. 48 Rather, it roots itself in the question of the
private right "to be let alone" in public. If"a zone of privacy"'4 9 exists, then is it in "a sphere of space .. that a man may carry with
him into his bedroom or into the street?"50 If "the concept of a right
to privacy attempts to draw a line between the.

. .

self and society," 51

must that line vanish when confronted by the openness which lies beyond our doorsteps? In other words, do we not have the right to establish a "zero-relationship '5 2 with others, relative to interactions and/or
communications, in a public context if we so choose?
Not surprisingly, even this narrowed perspective on the privacy
question is perplexingly replete with issues, each containing its own distinguishable dimensions. Without ignoring this factor, we will specifically concentrate here on the issue of "public thrusting" on unconsenting adults or, what may be termed the right not to be expressed to,
outside the home.58 Upon whom does the burden fall, the expresser
to curtail his message or the expressee to avert his eyes? As a vehicle
for this exploration, we will concentrate on the Supreme Court's decision in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville.54
Although there are aspects of Erznoznik that are external to our
direct concern, the case, nevertheless, provides us with a useful nexus
for inquiries on the avertable eye question. To begin with, this case
48. See A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); S. WAmRN & L. BRAmmS, THE
RIGHT TO PRIVACY 133-52 (1890). For general reviews of privacy, see Bloustein, The
First Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme Court Justice and the Philosopher, 28
RuTGERS L. REV. 41 (1974); Comment, The ConstitutionalRight of Privacy: An Examination, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 253 (1974).
49. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
50. Konvitz, Privacy and the Law, 31 LAw AND CONTEuM. PROB. 272, 279-80
(1966).
51. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FRFDOM OF EXPRESsION 545 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM].
52. Shils, Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 LAw AND CoNTM&P. PROB.
281 (1966).
53. See Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not to be Spoken to? 67
Nw. U.L REv. 153 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Haiman, Speech v. Privacy]. But see
Note, Filthy Words, the FCC, and the First Amendment: Regulating Broadcast Obscenity, 61 VA. L. REv.579 (1975).
54. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
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does not involve the right to privacy within the ambit of the freedom

of expression, but rather presents the clash between these two ideals.
The scope of privacy here, whether based on "emanations," "penumbras," and/or extrapolations from Madison's 9th Amendment," is
freedom from expression, not freedom to expressY0 Second, since
this case touches upon the areas of sex and obscenity, an additional

factor is added to make the attempts at line-drawing even more
fascinating (including, for example, the question of "protecting" nonadults)." Lastly, the nature of Erznoznik presents us with the opportunity to focus clearly on the intricate and dynamic aspects of line-drawing as the issues of "the right to be let alone" in public, the first amend-

ment, and police power each run into others.
Before turning to the specifics of the case, it is worthwhile to note
briefly two academic works, related to the issues at hand, that have not
gone unnoticed by the Court.

These two studies have many points in

common, but at the same time are divergent in several key areas, thus
providing useful perspectives on the Court's decision and line-drawing
with regard to the issue of the avertable eye.

The first of these works is Thomas Emerson's The System of
Freedom of Expression.5

Arguing that the Court has never devel-

oped any comprehensive theory of what the first amendment expression guarantee means, Emerson goes on to offer his system for freedom
of expression. 9 For our purposes two themes in his voluminous work
55. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965); J. DOUGLAS, THE RIoHT OF
57 (1975), originally published prior to Griswold, where Douglas wrote:
' There is, indeed, a congeries of these rights [procedural and substantive] that may
conveniently be called the right to be let alone." He did not at this point, however,
mention the ninth amendment. For a brief discussion and outline of the use of this
amendment, see L. JAYSON, THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 1257-58 (rev. ed. 1973).
We should also keep in mind that: "The Senate rejected that amendment which Madison
said he prized above all others, the one that prohibited the states from infringing on
personal rights"; see R. RuLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1776-1791, at 215
(1969). Lastly, we should mention the importance of Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961). For the development of the constitutional right of privacy, see G. E. WHITE, THE AMERiCAN JUDIcr.L, supra note 6, at 351-56.
THE PEOPLE

56. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM, supra note 51, at 549, where he states that: "The

problem of reconciling First Amendment rights and privacy rights, where they conflict,
is therefore one of defining the constitutional boundaries of the privacy system."
57. We will not deal directly with the what, how, where and why of obscenity, and
will resist the strong temptation to wallow a bit here.

See H. ABRAHAM,

FREEDOM,

supra note 24, at 176.
58. Supra, note 51; see also T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1966).
59. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM, supra note 51, at 15, 717; see also H. BLACic, A CONSTI'UTIONAL FArrH, suprd note 23, at 43-66,
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stand out. These are the notion of a "captive audience" and the distinction between expression and action. Taking the latter point first,
Emerson, recognizing the "special status" of expression, emphasizes
the need to draw a line between expression and action, despite the inherent difficulties of so doing.6" His reasoning here is not so much
a commitment to Justice Black's conception of the Bill of Rights, as
it is an appreciation of the fact that expression can be protected from
the authority and power of state and society only by differentiating it
from action. 6 ' Importantly for us, Emerson states: "If an obscene
communication is forced upon another person against his will it can
have a 'shock effect' and thus a communication can properly be described as 'action."' 6 2, Thus, "forcing obscenity upon another person
constitutes an invasion of his privacy, and for that reason . . . falls

outside the system of freedom of expression."'63 In other words, since
sex, in its broad sense, has a "shock effect" in our society, its actual
manifestations (e.g., nudity or intercourse) in public, present us with
an action, not an expression, and thereby can be justly restricted. To
counsel that we should lie down together is one thing, to use the streets
to demonstrate that counsel is another matter.
The significance Emerson attaches to the "shock effect" of a
communication can also be seen in his analysis of the notion of a "captive audience." In his view, it is intolerable that someone be "compelled to see or hear erotic communications," and therefore "an advertisement on a billboard or on a theater marquee might be prohibited
whereas the same advertisement in a book could not."64 Citing the
Court's per curiam opinion in Redrup v. New York,65 Emerson
believed that the Court was prepared to accept the doctrine of "shock
effect." 60
The second work to be considered, Franklyn Haiman's important
60. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM, supra note 51, at 8-9, 495, 717-18; but see H. BLAcK,
A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH, supra note 23, at 53-58.
61. T. EMEMRSON, THE SYsTEM, supra note 51, at 9.
62. Id. at 496 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 495.
64. Id. at 500, 501. See also Brandeis' opinion in Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S.
105 (1932).
65. 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967) (where the absence of any assualt upon individual
privacy, such that it would be impossible for the unwilling observer to avoid exposure
to it, was specifically noted).
66. See T. EMERsON, THm SYSTEM, supra note 51, at 501. Also consult H. ABRAHAM, FREFDOM, supra note 24, at 185.
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article, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not To Be Spoken To?,67
offers us a different perspective on the issue of the avertable eye.
While the article covers a wide field (including the introduction of theories of "the psychology of the human communications process!' into
the debate), 68 our attention is drawn to his "proposed set of guiding
principles." These are stated in terms of a general proposition, four
corollaries, and two additional principles.
[General proposition:] The law should not attempt to
insulate any person in our society, no matter how willing or
unwilling an audience they may be, from the initial impact of
any kind of communication, but that the law should protect
their right to escape from a continued bombardment by that
communication if they wish to be free from it.
[Corollary One:] A critical distinction must be made between situations in which the target of a communication is
physically free to escape from its continuation and those in
which the target is physically captive.
[Corollary Two:] The target of communication is physically unable to 'turn off' the message.
[Corollary Three:] Considerations of voluntarism with
respect to the target's initial presence at the scene of communication should be regarded as irrelevant.
[CorollaryFour:] In circumstances where the receiver
of communication is physically unable either to remove himself from the source of an unwelcome message or to 'turn it
off,' and has also exhausted all other possible means, including self-imposed inattention, for shutting out the flow of communication beyond its initial impact, he should then be entitled to protection by the law. Suppression of a communication itself should thus be viewed as a last resort when less
restrictive alternatives have failed.
[FirstAdditional Principle:] There can be no guarantee
through the law that a person, short of sealing himself in a
room, will be immune from unwanted communicative interruptions.
[Second Additional Principle:] There must be no restric67. Supra, note 53. See also F. HMAN, The Rhetoric of the Streets: Some Legal
and Ethical Considerations,in DissENT: SYBoomLs BMHVIOR AND RHETOMCAL STRATEG"ms (H. Bosmajian ed. 1972).
68. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy, supra note 53, at 182-83. The categories that Haiman surveys are: door-to-door solicitation; residential picketing; unwanted telephone
calls and mail; public address systems and sound trucks; and billboards and other public
thrusting. Haiman also offers a useful, if not always on target, evaluation of the restrictive position. Id. at 177-85.
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tion on uninvited communications on the grounds that either
the content of the message or the manner of its expression
may be offensive to some persons
[including children]6 9 upon
70
fall.
may
it
ears
or
eyes
whose
In short, Haiman's position is that we cannot allow our sympathies
for "tender psyches" and "the right to be let alone" in public to produce
"serious erosions of the first amendment," and that privacy is sufficiently safeguarded if the unconsenting can escape after their first exposure.7 1 Unlike Emerson, Haiman's concern with our choice over the
messages we receive and the intrinsic offensiveness of certain communications is small indeed.
With these differing perspectives in mind, we now return to
Erznoznik to see how the Court there drew its lines in the difficult task
of dividing the pie of individual freedom between the positive freedom
of expression and the negative freedom to be free from expression in
2
public.7
More than three years elapsed from the time that Richard
Erznoznik, manager of the University Drive-In Theater, was charged
with violating the municipal code of Jacksonville, Florida, 73 and the decision of the Supreme Court reversing his conviction on the above
charge. The ordinance in question made it unlawful, and declared it
a public nuisance, for any "person connected with or employed by any
drive-in theater in the City to exhibit, or aid or assist in exhibiting, any
motion picture, slide, or other exhibit in which the male or female bare
buttocks, human female bare breasts, or human bare pubic areas are
shown, if such motion picture, slide, or other exhibit is visible from any
public street or public place. 17 4 The movie in question, "Class of '74,"
R-rated, contained pictures of uncovered female breasts and buttocks
and was visible from public streets and places.
69. Id. at 192-99. For some perspectives on the issue of "children" or "minors",
see Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas,
390 U.S. 676 (1968); and Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
70. Iaiman, Speech and Privacy, supra note 53, at 194-99.
71. Id. at 199, argues that: "The human psyche, whether adult or juvenile, is
tougher than most of its would-be protectors are inclined to admit." Also see his comments on juveniles, Id. at 198.
72. In this context, we are speaking of a zero-sum game.
73. JACKSONViLLE, FLA., MuNic. CODE, § 330.313 (1972).
74. Id. (emphasis added). See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205
(1975). In this case, the District Court of Appeals for the First District of Florida
affirmed the ruling of the trial court, 288 So. 2d 260 (1974). The Florida Supreme
Court denied certiorariwith three-judges dissenting,-294 So.2d 93 (1974).
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The trial court upheld the ordinance as a legitimate exercise of
police power. The District Court of Appeals affirmed the decision re78
lying on a similar judgment in Chemline, Inc. v. City of GrandPrairie
and City of Grand Prairie v. Chemline, Inc.,76 but ignoring a later
court of appeals decision in Cinecom Theaters Midwest States, Inc.
v. City of Fort Wayne.77 Cinecom ruled an ordinance very much like
Jacksonville's unconstitutional for overbreadth. In his opinion for the
Seventh Circuit, Judge Campbell responded to the contention of Fort
Wayne, that this ordinance was a valid protection for children and unconsenting adults whose privacy was violated by the "offensive"
material thrust upon them, with the following points: 7
First: The court was not persuaded by the Chemline decision, and
legal considerations influenced the court that were not considered
there.
Second:
Since Chemline, the Supreme Court had decided Interstate Circuit,Inc. v. Dallas,79 invalidating for vagueness a protective ordinance for children relative to the classification of films. Thus, while
laws can exist for the "protection" of children in the area of obscenity,
as in Ginsberg v. New York, 0 even nonadults should not be subjected
to the mere whim of the censors. 8 ' Here the Court was not faced with
obscenity in the typical sense, and the breadth of the ordinance could
have precluded the presentation of innocuous or culturally beneficial
items for children.
Third: In line with Redrup v. New York"2 and Cohen v. California,"3 the "assault" here was not "so obtrusive" nor so narrowly defined*
as to require protection more than the adverting of the unwilling party's
eyes.
Fourth: The police power issue, relative to traffic regulation, was
nonexistent in the facts before the court.
Fifth: Though drive-in theaters may be regulated more than
other theaters, the court must be careful on the freedom of expression
75. 364 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1966).
76. 364 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1966).
77. 473 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1973).
78. Here we are not replicating the judge's opinion, but rather are indicating his
position through our words.
79. 390 U.S. 676 (1968).
80. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
81. Rabeck v. New York, 391 U.S. 462 (1968).
82. 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
83. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). See also T. EmsoN, THE SYSThM, supra note 51, at 501.
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question."4 "The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut out discourse solely to protect others from hearing it, is

dependent on a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.""5 Such a situation was not

presented in this case.
After the Florida Supreme Court denied certiorari, the U.S.

Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction, and Justice Powell, writing
for the Court, stated that the Jacksonville ordinance was facially invalid
as an infringement of first amendment rights.8 6 Powell's opinion for
the six man majority followed very closely the line of reasoning produced by Judge Campbell, even though there was but a passing reference to Cinecom.

The city ordinance clearly went beyond films that could be classi87
fied as obscene under the Court's 1973 Miller v. California decision.
Therefore, as in Cinecom, the case resolved not on the obscenity issue
per se (since the films in question were entitled to first amendment
protection), but rather on the City's contention that any movie containing nudity may be suppressed as a nuisance, if visible from public
places.8 The reasons for this suppression raised by Jacksonville followed those stated by the City of Fort Wayne.
Justice Powell replied to the City's position by noting that:
"This Court has considered analogous issues-pitting the
First Amendment rights of speakers against the privacy rights
of those who may be unwilling viewers or auditors-in a
variety of contexts. Such cases, demand delicate balancing
because [they occur in a] . . . 'sphere of collision between

claims of privacy and those of [free speech.

.. ].9

84. When we refer to the first amendment in this case we, of course, mean as "incorporated" into the fourteenth amendment. For a general review of incorporation, see
H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT, supra note 24, at 29-88. See also Joseph
Burstyn Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), overruling Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial
Comm., 236 U.S. 230 (1915).
85. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
86. 422 U.S. 205, 206-18. See also Note, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARv.
L. REv.(1975), for a discussion of the "legal" aspects of Erznoznik.
87. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See also Paris Adult Theater v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
(1973). In Slaton, the Court adhered to the principle which was established in Roth
v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476 (1957), that obscene material is not protected by the first and
fourteenth amendments.
88. On obscenity and the first amendment, consult H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM M
Tim COURT, supra note 24, at 176-89. See also R. FuNSTON, PONooGrAHY AND POLITICS: THE COURT, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE CoMMIIssION, in JUDICIAL CRISES:
SUPREME COURT IN A CHANGING AMERiCA (1974).

89. 422 U.S. 205, 208 (1975)

THE

quoting partially from Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol13/iss1/7

18

Provizer: Of Lines and Men: The Supreme Court, Obscenity, and the Issue of
TULSA LAW JOURNAL

(Vol. 13: 52

Each case depends on its own specific facts, but there are certain gen-

eral principles that have developed.
For the majority, there were three such general principles relevant

here. First, a state or local government may protect "privacy" by establishing reasonable and narrow regulations dealing with the time,
place, and manner of expression when applied to all speech irrespective

of content, but not when the government acts as a censor "to shield
the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more

offensive than others."90

Second, this form of selective restriction

has been upheld "when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the

home" but not relative to the general right "to be let alone" in public. 91
Third, this form of selective restriction has also been upheld when "the
degree of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or
'9 2

auditor to avoid exposure.

The three general principles articulated, combined with the fact

that in today's complex society "we are inescapably captive audiences
for many purposes,"' ' 3 did not support the city's claim in this case.
Outside of narrow circumstances, Powell opined, "[Tihe Constitution
does not permit the government to decide which types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for the unwilling listener or viewer."94 The burden, in other words, falls not
primarily on the expresser, but on the viewer to protect his sensibilities
95
"simply by averting [his] eyes."1
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975). See also Nebraska PresA Ass'n v. Stewart, 427 U.S.
539 (1976).
90. 422 U.S. at 209. See also, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Police Department v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
91. 422 U.S. at 209. See also Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
Also note here the issue of a drive-in screen visible through the windows of a home.
Does this intrude on the privacy of the home? This issue which we do not directly deal
with was involved in an earlier drive-in case, Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (1972),
but the Court there avoided drawing any significant lines by basing its opinion on narrow procedural grounds.
92. 422 U.S. at 209 (emphasis added). See also Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418
U.S. 298 (1974); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
93. Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970).
94. 422 U.S. at 210. See also, Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 905 (1972)
(Powell, J., dissenting): "It has also been suggested that government may proscribe by
a properly framed law, 'that willful use of scurrilous language calculated to offend the
sensibilities of an unwilling audience."' See the discussion of the 1972 trilogy (Rosenfeld, Id.; Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S.
914 (1972)) in G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES ADM MA'Rnsts 1184-86
(1975). Powell dissented in Rosenfeld, but concurred in the other two cases. See also
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
95. 422 U.S. at 211. See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Spence
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The opinion then moves to a consideration of the protection of
nonadults, where it concludes (in line with Judge Campbell's decision)
that "if Jacksonville's ordinance is intended to regulate expression accessible to minors it is overbroad in its proscription." 96 The third
reason presented by the city for its ordinance, that of traffic regulation
(raised for the first time in oral argument), is dealt with rather curtly:
"By singling out movies containing even the most fleeting and innocent
glimpses of nudity the legislative classification is strikingly underinclusive. There is no reason to think that a wide variety of other scenes
in the customary screen diet. . . would be any less distracting to the
'97
passing motorist.
Lastly, Powell's opinion focused on the reasons for holding the
ordinance facially invalid and noted the difficulties in narrowing its
construction and the unwelcome choice facing drive-in operators (i.e.,
"restrict their movie offerings or construct adequate protective fencing
which may be extremely expensive or even physically impracticable"). 9 8 Thus, without deprecating "the legitimate interests asserted
by the city of Jacksonville," the Court found that the ordinance in question "does not satisfy rigorous constitutional standards that apply when
government attempts to regulate expression." 99
Not surprisingly, the lines drawn by the Court here were not based
on any simple form of unanimity. In a concurring opinion, Justice
Douglas continued adherence to his position that any state or federal
regulation of obscenity is prohibited by the Constitution. He argued
that while "under proper circumstances, a narrowly drawn ordinance
could be utilized within constitutional boundaries to protect the interests of captive audiences or to promote highway safety," 100 no such
regulation could be made selectively on the basis of content without
intruding upon the freedom of expression guarantees of the Constitu10 1
tion.
While Douglas's view implies that the Court, in part, reached its
v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
96. 422 U.S. at 214.
97. Id. at 214-15.
98. Id. at 217. Cf. Olympic Drive-In Theater, Inc. v. City of Pagedale, 441 S.W.2d
5, 8 (Mo. 1969) (relative to the cost of blocking the screen from view).
99. 422 U.S. at 217.
100. 422 U.S. at 218 (Douglas, J., concurring).
101. Id. See also Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (Douglas,
J., concurring); Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
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results through the questionable process of balancing the unbalanceable, to Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent 0 2 (joined by Rehnquist),
the Court erred in its judgment by mechanically applying principles developed from cases which had little to do with each other or Erznoznik.
The Court, from Burger's perspective,
seems to begin and end with the sweeping proposition that,
regardless of the circumstances, government may not regulate
any form of 'communicative' activity on the basis of its content.
None of the cases upon which the Court relies remotely
implies that the Court even intended to establish inexorable
limitations upon state power in this area. Many cases upheld
the regulation of communicative activity and did not purport
to define the limits of the power to do so.103

Relying on the "tyranny of absolutes" (to use Justice Frankfurter's
phrase), the majority here disregards the admonition articulated by the
plurality opinion in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights that "the nature

of the forum and the conflicting interests have remained important in
determining the degree of protection afforded by the First Amendment to the speech in question."'0 4 In this regard, the Chief Justice
contended, the Court cannot ignore "the unique visual medium" regulated by the ordinance, both in terms of its physical structure and its
presentation of images to the passing, unconsenting viewer.' 05
Furthermore, Burger would hold that since the ordinance does not
restrict (in a prohibitive sense) constitutionally protected expression,
but rather regulates "the contents of a certain type of display," the involvement of first amendment interests in the case are, at best, "trivial."
If a play held indoors featured nudity, would that mean that the nude
performers could hold their production in public, immune to ordinances
dealing with indecent exposure? The Chief Justice thinks not, and
similarly the Jacksonville ordinance, while "no model of draftmanship,"
does not suppress the expression ideas per se, but is rather based on
legitimate state interests and the accepted police power to regulate
nudity "regardless of any incidental effect upon communication."' 100
102. 422 U.S. at 218 (Burger, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 219.
104. 418 U.S. at 302-03.
105. 422 U.S. at 222. See also, Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932).
106. 422 U.S. at 223. See also Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972);
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
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Although Burger does not mention his concurring opinion in Rabe
v. Washington, 1 7 his position expressed there is clearly applicable to
his Erznoznik dissent:
I, for one, would be unwilling to hold that the First Amendment prevents a State from prohibiting such a public display
of scenes depicting explicit sexual activities if the State undertook to do so under a statute narrowly drawn to protect the
public from potential exposure to such offensive materials.
Public displays of explicit materials . . . are not significantly different from any noxious public nuisance traditionally within the power of the States to regulate and prohibit,
and, in my view, involve no significant countervailing First
Amendment considerations.'""
In short, the purveyor of questionable materials should be expected to shield them from public view even more than the unconsenting viewer should be expected to avert his eyes.
A similar view is taken by Justice White in his dissent in
Erznonik,0 9 but White also noted an additional area of disagreement
with the Court's decision, which is of importance to the issue of linedrawing. To White's mind, the Court's conclusion "that the limited
privacy interest of persons on the public streets cannot justify this censorship of otherwise protected speech on the basis of its content,""'
was not incorrect, but also unnecessary. For if the rationale of the majority that the ordinance was overbroad relative to the protection of
children is accepted, then the ordinance would be fatally overbroad as
to the population generally, and that part of the opinion dealing with
"limited privacy interest" is superfluous. The Court, in other words,
did not limit its constitutional judgment to the minimum level needed
for its decision, but set forth principles which went beyond that level."'
Keeping in mind the views of the Justices expressed in Erznoznik,
as well as the perspectives presented by Emerson and Haiman, several
observations can be made on the process of line-drawing in this case.
The first of these observations is that, unlike its per curiam
107. 405 U.S. 313, 316 (1972).
concurring) (citations omitted).
108. Id. at 317 (Burger, J.and Rehnquist, J.,
109. 422 U.S. at 224.
110. Id. at 212.
111. See Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the Flow
of Information to the Justices, 61 VA. L. RPv. 1187, 1193 (1975), Proposition No. 1
("The Supreme Court tends to ignore narrow 'adjudicative' facts and to focus on larger,
more general problems.").
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decision in Rabe v. Washington, 12 the Court in Erznoznik faced, at
least in part, the clash of interests (between privacy in public and expression) and drew some lines. As we have seen, arguments can be
formulated to show how the Court could, and perhaps should, have
avoided certain issues within the case. Also, alternative routes to the
Court's results can be articulated based upon the United States v.

O'Brienl governmental interests test. But what remains most significant for our discussion is the fact that many of the Court's lines are
more apparent than real.
This leads us to another observation. While the Court seems to
reject Emerson's position that sexually oriented material thrust upon an
unconsenting person has a "shock effect," and as such lies outside of
freedom of expression, it does so only in a limited sense. The decision
deals with constitutionally protected speech and does not preclude the
careful regulation of highly erotic material and/or acts.114 Where the
legitimate interests of a city are clear and properly framed in law, the
Court's opinion in Erznoznik would not appear to stand in its way.
To put it somewhat differently, the "Fernwood Flasher" would not
rush out to purchase a new London Fog.
Similarly, the Court's decision relative to the averting of one's eye
away from personally objectionable activities is not total or complete.
Here the Court is closer to Haiman's position than that of Emerson,
yet the line drawn by the Court is not nearly so clear cut as that established in the former's article." 5 As noted above not all visual forms
are to be tolerated, and, furtherfore, Justice Powell raises some additional questions on the "captive audience" issue by his use of language.
While citing Redrup, that the screen of a drive-in theater is not "so
obtrusive as to make it impossible for an unwilling individual to avoid
exposure to it,""" Powell also states that selective restrictions have
been upheld when "the degree of captivity makes it impractical for the
unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure.'1'1 A test of impracti112. 405 U.S. 313 (1972) (reversing the conviction in question on narrow procedural
grounds without deciding the broad constitutional issues raised). See the discussion of
Rabe in Haiman, Speech v. Privacy, supra note 53, at 173-75, and especially note the
decision of the Court of Appeals reviewed there.
113. 391 U.S. at 377. See also, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HAv. L. Ray.
1, 129 (1975).
114. See Smayda v. U.S., 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965).
115. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy, supra note 53, at 160.
116. 422 U.S. at 212 (quoting from Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967)).
117. 422 U.S. at 209 (citing Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974),
in support of this proposition).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1977

23

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 13 [1977], Iss. 1, Art. 7

1977]

OF LINES AND MEN

cability is one which has much more leeway than a test of impossibility,
thus the distinction is not without importance.
In line with these factors, we should take notice of the perspective
that: "Overbreadth review should . . . be employed only when the
Court is unable to formulate a satisfactory general rule of privilege."" 5
In Erznoznik, the "Court's choice of overbreadth review, then, signals
reluctance to forfeit doctrinal flexibility by announcing a comprehensive rule governing the conflict between privacy and expression."' 119
That the Court utilized the stance that one's eyes can be averted
from nudity projected on a drive-in screen, just as they could be
averted from the politically relevant epithet on Paul Cohen's jacket, is
not without import.120 That the Court drew some lines that were not
so unclear and indefinite as to be without meaning, and that those lines
have implications beyond the specific case in question, is also of no
small significance.12' Yet Erznoznik was far from a final word; just
how far would be illustrated one year and one day later.
Before looking at Erznoznik as a precedent, it is of value to
restate two fundamental, if not innovative, points. The first of these
is the oft-mentioned fact that previous judicial decisions rest in a
cornucopia from which we choose those most supportive of our position. The second point is that decisions in individual cases are subject
to multiple interpretations. In our discussion, for example, we have
seen how Redrup was used as a departure point for two quite different
trips, one interpreting the decision as an indication that the Court was
prepared to accept the "shock effect" idea, the other utilizing the de22
cision as grounding for a movement away from the same.'
With this dynamism in mind, let us take a brief glance at the 1976
Detroit adult-film zoning case, Young v. American Mini Theaters,
118. The Supreme Court,1974 Term, 89 HAIv. L. REv. 1, 129, 131 (1975).
119. Id. at 131.
120. The epithet in question in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971), was
"Fuck the Draft." Here, see the discussion of the "double standard" in H. ABiAHA,
FREEDoM AND THE COURT, supra note 24, at 8-28; see also Goodpaster, The Constitution and FundamentalRights, 15 Aniz. L. REv. 479 (1973).
121. See Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the Flow
of Information to the Justices, 61 VA. L. REv. 1193, 1193-99 (1975). While it can be
argued that the Court in Erznoznik focused on "larger, more general problems" than
necessary, it would be difficult to hold that the particular facts in the case "were a matter of almost no concern. . . to the Justices."
122. Compare T. EMRSON, Tnn SYsTEM, supra note 51, at 501, with Powell's opinion for the Court in Erznoznik, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
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Inc. 2 3 Although this five to four decision by the Court did not
directly deal with the avertable eye question, the debate over the meaning of Erznoznik in the four opinions filed, provides us with important

perspectives on the Court's decision in Erznoznik.
Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Stevens upheld

Detroit's zoning ordinance on adult movie theaters against a challenge
of unconstitutionality, and by so doing reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 2 Without detailing Steven's opinion, the
following arguments made by the Justice are most crucial for the concern of this paper:
First: The location of several adult theaters in a neighborhood
tends to have a detrimental effect on that neighborhood in physical,
criminal, moral, and economic terms.12 5
Second: "We are not persuaded that the Detroit zoning ordinances will have a significant deterrent effect on the exhibition of films
126
protected by the First Amendment.'
Third: The Court emphasized that all theaters were subject to
some zoning and commercial restrictions.

27

So long as the restrictions

imposed as to the time, place and manner of speech were reason-

able, 2 " the disparate treatment of adult theaters from other theaters

did not offend the first amendment.

29

The fact that the distinction

was based upon the content of the films shown was relevant only to
30

the equal protection question.1
Fourth: In considering whether such a content-based distinction
did violate equal protection, the Court said:

123. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). Note the issue of prior restraint in this case and keep in
mind that Chase & Ducat, CONSTITUTONAL INTERPRETATION (1975), list Erznoznik
under Freedom of Press/Prior Restraint. It is also useful here to compare the Court's
vote in Erznoznik and American Mini Theaters:
Erznoznik: Powell delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Douglas,
Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun. Douglas filed a concurring opinion. Burger dissented and was joined by Rehnquist. White filed a separate
dissent (6:3).
American Mini Theaters: Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, joined
by Burger, White, Powell (in part), and Rehnquist. Powell also concurred in
part. Stewart dissented, joined by Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun. Blackmun also dissented, joined by Brennan, Stewart and Marshall. (5:4).
The major shift is thus related to the replacement of Douglas' by Stevens' and Powell's
votes. Throughout our discussion, emphasis has been added to highlight our concerns.
124. American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir. 1975).
125. 427 U.S. at 54-56, 71-72.
126. Id. at 60.
127. Id. at 62.
128. Id. at 63 n.18.
129. Id. at 63.
130. Id.
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[W]e learned long ago that broad statements of principle,
no matter how correct in the context in which they are made,
are sometimes qualified by contrary decisions before the absolute limit of the stated principle is reached. When we review this Court's actual adjudications in the First Amendment
area, we find this to have been the case with the stated principle that there may be no restriction whatever on expressive
activity because of its content. 1
Fifth: After reviewing the numerous areas in which first amendment protection varied according to the content of the speech, the
Court went on to discuss how such restrictions could be applied to
obscenity:
Surely the First Amendment does not foreclose such . . .
prohibition[s]; yet it is equally clear that any such prohibition
must rest squarely on an appraisal of the content of material
otherwise within a constitutionally protected area.
Such a line may be drawn on the basis of content without violating the Government's paramount obligation of neutrality in its regulation of protected communication. For the
regulation of the places where sexually explicit films may be
exhibited is unaffected by whatever social, political, or philosophical messages the film may be intended to communicate .... 132

Sixth:
[I]t is manifest that society's interest in protecting this
type of expression is of a . . . lesser magnitude .... 13
[Flew of us would march our sons and daughters off to war
to preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited in the theaters of our choice. .

.

.[We hold

that the State may legitimately use the content of these materials as the basis for placing them in a different classification
from other motion pictures. 3

Since many of the major points in American Mini Theatres do
not appear to comport too comfortably with the reasoning in Erznoznik,
the newest Justice spent considerable time (albeit in footnotes) 135
attempting to justify both decisions. For example, he stated that:
"The Court's opinion in Erznoznik presaged our holding today by noting that the presumption of statutory validity 'has less force when a
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 65-66 (emphasis added).
Id. at 69-70.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 70-71.
427 U.S. at 71-72 nn.34 & 35.
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classification turns on a subject matter of expression.' "131 Furthermore, Stevens points out that whereas the Detroit ordinance attempts
to avoid the "secondary" effects of adult movie houses (i.e., area deterioration and crime), not the dissemination of "offensive" expression,
the Jacksonville ordinance's justification rested primarily on the protection of its citizens from exposure to unwanted and "offensive" expression.
Granted that distinctions between the two cases exist, it is nonetheless difficult, in light of the major lines of reasoning in both cases,
to avoid the feeling that the Justice "doth protest too much."'' 1 Having just torpedoed the ship, the scramble is on for wreckage on which
to cling.
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, noted that while he
agreed with much of the Court's decision, he did not agree with the view

that "nonobscene, erotic materials may be treated differently under
First Amendment principles from other forms of protected expression."138 To Powell, the case was one of "innovative land-use,"'"8 with
freedom of expression concerns only incidental. Thus while the "[rlespondents would have us mechanically apply the doctrines developed
in other contexts. . . . [This situation is not analogous to [those]
cases ... "140

Moving from that statement (which is closely akin to Burger's
view in his Erznoznik dissent)141 Powell wrote: "The constraints of the
ordinance with respect to location may indeed create economic loss for
some who are engaged in this business. The inquiry for First Amendment purposes is not concerned with economic impact; rather it looks
only to the effect of the ordinance upon freedom of expression."' 42
Yet in his Erznoznik opinion, the Justice had offered the position that
the Jacksonville ordinance would "deter drive-in theaters from showing
movies containing any nudity, however innocent or even educa-136. Id. at 72 n.35 (quoting from Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205,
215 (1975)).
137. Another uncomfortable feeling that arises here is that much of the Court's distinction between the two cases can be linked to a poorly prepared presentation by the
City of Jacksonville, rather than "real" differences.
138. 427 U.S. at 73 n.1.
139. Id. at 73.
140. Id. at 76.
141. The Jacksonville ordinance was struck down "by a mechanical application of
'general principles' distilled from cases having little to do with either this case or each
other". 422 U.S. at 219.
142. 427 U.S. at 78.
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tional,"'14 3 within the context of the cost to block the screen from public
view. The deterrent effect of the Jacksonville ordinance was real and
substantial, since the owners of drive-in theaters were "faced with an
unwelcome choice .
they must either restrict their movie offerings
or construct adequate protective fencing which may be extremely ex1 44
pensive or even physically impracticable."
In his American Mini Theaters concurring opinion, Powell also
utilized the tests of United States v. O'Brien,14 and argued that the
ordinance in question met these tests noting that Detroit had not embarked on an effort to suppress free expression.' 4 6 Lastly, Powell
attempted to answer the dissent's reliance on Erznoznik for its present
position by pointing out the distinctions between the cases and finding:
"In sum, the ordinance in Erznoznik was a misconceived attempt directly
to regulate content of expression. The Detroit zoning ordinance, in contrast, affects expression only incidentally and in furtherance of governmental interests wholly unrelated to the regulation of expression.' 4 7
The major dissent in American Mini Theatres was that of Justice
Stewart.148 Without pulling his punches, Stewart noted that American
Mini Theatres was "an aberration" and argued that "[tihe factual
parallels between that case [Erznoznik] and this one are striking."' 4 9
It is not our purpose here to pass judgment on the judges or to
separate the heroes from the villians; rather, it is sufficient for us to
point out that these cases indicate the dynamic complexity of line-drawing and the changing nature of the judicial balancing act. They illustrate that the issue of the avertable eye is far from closed.
143. 422 U.S. at 211.
144. Id. at 217 (emphasis added).
145. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See also, 427 U.S. at 79.
146. 427 U.S. at 79.
147. 427 U.S. at 84.
148. 427 U.S. at 84 (with whom Brennan, J., Marshall, J., Blaekmun, J., joined dissenting).
149. 427 U.S. at 87, 88, stating that the first amendment requires:
[t]hat time, place and manner regulations that affect protected expression be
content-neutral except in the limited context of a captive or juvenile audience ....
The guarantees of the Bill of Rights were designed to protect
against precisely such majoritarian limitations on individual liberty.
The Court must never forget that the consequences of rigorously enforcing the guarantees of the First Amendment are frequently unpleasant. Much
speech that seems to be of little or no value will enter the market-place of
ideas, threatening the quality of our social discourse and, more generally, the
serenity of our lives. But this is the price to be paid for constitutional freedom.

Id. at 86, 88.
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V. A BRlUF REPRISE
In the preface of this paper, we quoted Louis Henkin's statement
that: "Judgment consists in drawing lines." The discussion in the
section that followed gave numerous indications of what arduous tasks
are involved in that process, as judges "back and fill, zig and zag, groping through the mist for a line of thought which will in the end satisfy
their standards of craft and their vision of the policy of the community
they must try and interpret.'"
When we are faced with the clash of interests between "the right
to be let alone" in public and freedom of expression, we are caught
in the pull of socio-cultural issues, as well as those of a politicalconstitutional nature. The freedom to express is pivotal for any society
which voices a belief in individual liberty; yet that freedom is not without boundaries, especially when the form and function of expression
blends into the realm of action. We rightfully desire that our sensibilities, however defined, not be offended; yet such offensives are often
inextricably interwoven into the fabric of a free society. We are ofttimes captives of such disparate items as fashion and location, 15 1 for
we have long passed beyond the simple world where true "zerorelationships" are possible.
The context is constantly changing and we must be prepared to
avert our eyes and by so doing defer to the first amendment. Yet such
deference does not mean that no limits exist in a given time/place
framework.' 52 When rights are in conflict, some mode of accommodation must be sought. In this area, reasonable regulation is the watchword. 5 ' We cannot allow the exercise of a right to be voided, simply
because it might annoy or offend the passerby.' 5 4 For such a view is
not only a denial of protection to minority perspectives, but it also lends
itself too easily to misuse. To use the words of the California Supreme
Court: "The right to speak one's view aloud, restricted by the ban that
150. E.

RosTow, THE SoVEREiGN PREROGATIVE, supra note 13, at 33.
151. Here we are thinking of see-through blouses, a string bikini, and Bourbon Street,
in that order.
152. It is of critical importance to recognize here that such limits, while they exist,
shift within differing time/place frameworks.
153. See T. EMERSON, THE SYsTEM, supra note 51, at 559; Saia v. New York, 334
U.S. 558 (1948); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949): "In spite of the general confusion left by two decisions, there appears to have been substantial agreement on principle. . .. iThere must be an accommodation between the two interests that would
allow reasonable regulation ....
"
See also A. Cox, SuPREM E CoURT, supra note 6,
at 47-8.
154. See, e.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
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prevented anyone from listening, would frame a hollow right." 155 At
the same time, however, we should not be compelled to enter the world
outside our doors with our eyes tightly shut, because we have run out
of places where we can confortably avert them; nor should we be
forced to be prisoners, each inside his own darkened room.
Faced with such a situation, it is difficult to accept either
extreme; we must engage in delicate balancing as we draw our lines.
' 6
It has been argued that line-drawing is "judgment of and by degree"15

and:
Yet the judgment of degree may be impossible to make save
by sheer arbitrariness, and then the judge's only remaining
choice is to sacrifice the result he would like to reach, the
result that conforms to the tendency he favors but is not quite
willing to follow to its principled conclusion. 5
But is not all judgment (i.e., the use of critical faculty to discern
and distinguish relationships and alternatives) fundamentally a matter
of degree? The act of balancing contains both substantive and procedural dimensions, and need not be prefaced by the term ad hoc. There
can be principled balancing when the lines drawn transcend the particulars of the moment. Admittedly, there will be imprecision and
doubt, but can it be otherwise in a system not in stasis? "In the final
analysis we must confidently look to the Court to draw a line based
on constitutional common sense. No other agency of government is
equally well qualified to do so"''
Perhaps the search for greater
finality is "like the anti-hero in a Lost Generation novel, looking for
God in the wrong places." 159
155. Wollam v. City of Palm Springs, 59 Cal. 2d 276, 284, 379 P.2d 481, 486; 29
Cal. Rptr. 1 (1963). See also Haiman, Speech v. Privacy, supra note 53, at 168-69.
156. A. BirEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDFA OF PROGRESS 60-61 (1970).
157. Id.
158. H. ABRAIAM, FREEDOOM AND THE COURT, supra note 24, at 205, (discussing the
freedom of expression). See also A. Cox, SUPREME COURT, supra note 6, at 118:
For the power of the great constitutional decisions rests upon the accuracy of
the Court's perception of this kind of common will and upon the Court's ability,
by expressing its perception, ultimately to command a consensus ... For me,
belief in the value of the enterprise is an article of faith.
159. R. Schroth, The Death and Life of Bishop Pike, N.Y. TIms, Aug. 1, 1976, at
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